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The neoclassical theory of consumer demand emerged, developed and reached its current 
standard form over the course of a century, from the time it appeared in the works of C. 
Menger and W.S. Jevons in 1871 up to the 1971 volume Preferences, Utility, and Demand 
edited by J.S. Chipman and others, which fine-tuned it in many ways. Several scholars have 
already studied the phases of this century-long development of consumer demand theory
1
. 
My analysis of the history of consumption theory between 1871 and 1971 focuses on three 
central aspects: the acceptance of a general utility function in place of the original additive 
utility function, the superseding of the cardinal utility framework according to either a be-




My historiographical reconstruction belongs to the genre of “rational reconstructions”. 
Since this expression originally coined by Lakatos (1971) has been interpreted in different 
and often pejorative ways, a terminological qualification is in order. First, by rational recon-
struction I mean a narrative which considers the development of economic science as fun-
damentally driven by theoretical questions rather than by personal, academic, social, politi-
cal, or economic factors. Second, my historical research is characterized by an epistemo-
logical approach which aims to understand the cognitive principles that seem to guide the 
development of neoclassical consumption theory. In this respect, the story I propose is a ra-
tional reconstruction in the sense that it attempts to rationalize the development of con-
sumer demand theory as regulated by such cognitive principles. 
What are these principles? Like many other branches of theoretical economics, con-
sumption analysis faces a trade-off between the “realism” of a theory and its “systematic-
ity”. I understand a theory’s realism to be the extent to which its assumptions and empirical 
implications are consistent with commonsensical, statistical or experimental evidence. If 
any assumption or implication of the theory does not correspond to commonsense evidence, 
statistical market data or the experimental findings obtained in a controlled environment, 
the theory is not wholly “realistic” or, put another way, it is to some extent “unrealistic”. In This draft: April 27, 2005 
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particular, one theory is “more realistic” than another if, ceteris paribus, the former has at 
least an assumption or an implication that corresponds better to commonsensical, statistical 
or experimental evidence
 3
. By systematicity of a theory I mean its power to derive the larg-
est possible set of exact implications concerning a certain phenomenon from the smallest 
possible set of exact assumptions. 
Now, my historical inquiry suggests that more realistic assumptions are introduced into 
consumption analysis only if they do not weaken the systematicity of the theory already 
achieved. If the inclusion of assumptions that correspond better to commonsense evidence, 
statistical data or experimental findings jeopardize the systematicity of the theory, they are 
simply set aside. This does not mean that the search for realism is irrelevant in neoclassical 
theorizing about consumption, but rather that the pursuit of systematicity is stronger than 
that of realism. One can say that neoclassical economics tries to maximize the realism of 
consumer theory under the constraint of preserving its systematic character. 
This conclusion suggests a more general set of questions. The effort of capturing the 
available evidence without blurring the systematicity of the theory appears to be an epis-
temic principle not only of neoclassical consumption theory, but of neoclassical economics 
in general. In fact, this principle seems to correspond to the method of successive approxi-
mations which neoclassical economists – at least from Menger’s defense of theoretical eco-
nomics against the Historical School during the Methodenstreit – have repeatedly upheld in 
response to the criticisms of lack of realism raised by various heterodox schools. The epis-
temological question is therefore: Why is the systematic nature of the theory so important 
for neoclassical economics? Is the hierarchy between systematicity and realism (in the sense 
that when the commitment to realism conflicts with the commitment to systematicity, the 
latter prevails) an idiosyncrasy of neoclassical economics, or is it instead rooted in a 
broader feature of scientific knowledge? Is there any relation between the central role that 
systematicity had and still has in neoclassical theorizing, and the fact that the neoclassical 
theory displaced and superseded the other approaches, and became the prevailing one? This draft: April 27, 2005 
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As I shall suggest, the available methodological theories of economics do not offer a sat-
isfactory response to these questions. However, there is an epistemological perspective 
which is virtually unexplored in the literature on economic methodology and appears useful 
in this respect. The epistemological perspective at issue is that of the so-called Marburg 
School, a Neo-Kantian philosophical movement which attained a leading position in Ger-
man philosophy during the late 19
th and early 20
th century, and whose main exponents were 
H. Cohen, P. Natorp and E. Cassirer
4
. My appraisal of the Marburg epistemology will stress 
the tenets of it that make the cognitive principles of neoclassical economics more compre-
hensible. Therefore, I choose to refer to a “Marburg-inspired” theory of knowledge when 
referring to the epistemological view I present and support in this paper. 
The aim of this work is therefore threefold. First, I claim that a Marburg-inspired theory 
of knowledge is useful in understanding the historical development of neoclassical con-
sumer theory. Second and more generally, I argue that the Marburg epistemological view 
allows us to grasp the principles that regulate the process of knowing in neoclassical eco-
nomics and does so better than other epistemological theories. Third, I suggest that a Mar-
burg theory of knowledge not only allows us to comprehend the actual cognitive logic of 
neoclassical economics but also gives it a philosophical justification. 
This does not mean that the economists who played a part in developing consumer the-
ory were somehow inspired by the Marburg epistemology: to my knowledge, none of them 
refer to it anywhere, nor do Cohen, Natorp, or Cassirer refer to economic science in their 
writings. Therefore, I am not claiming that the Marburg School’s epistemology is the hid-
den “muse-philosophy” of neoclassical economists. Moreover, neoclassical economists 
have professed and still profess different methodological views. Despite these differences, 
consumer theory seems to have stable, specific principles that regulate its development. 
These regulative principles, and not the possible, hidden roots of the methodological views 
of neoclassical economists are the subject of the paper. The point I would like to make is 
that a Marburg-inspired theory of knowledge explains such principles well. Consequently, This draft: April 27, 2005 
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the reconstruction of consumption theory I propose is not an investigation of hidden intel-
lectual backgrounds nor a search for possible influences, but rather a case for the general 
validity of the Marburg theory of knowledge. 
Even if the rediscovery of the Marburg epistemology was originally stimulated by abduc-
tive reasoning (“Which theory of knowledge can rationalize the way consumer demand the-
ory developed?”), the presentation approach I adopt in this paper is more deductive. There-
fore, in Section 1 I illustrate what I consider to be the main tenets of the Marburg theory of 
knowledge, and in the following sections I attempt to show how these tenets shed light on 
the historical development of neoclassical consumer theory. Accordingly, Section 2 is de-
voted to the acceptance of a general utility function in the theory; Section 3 examines how 
the cardinal framework was superseded, and Section 4 considers the axiomatic foundation 
of the ordinalist analysis. Finally, Section 5 briefly compares the Marburg perspective with 
some other trends in economic methodology and illustrates why the history of consumer 
theory can be best thought of in Neo-Kantian terms. 
 
1. The Marburg epistemological view 
Among the different trends included in Neo-Kantianism, the Marburg School is character-
ized by its logicist development of Kant’s theory of knowledge. Its main epistemological 
tenets can be outlined as follows: 
1) Things are never given in and of themselves, but are always mind-correlative. This 
means that things are always given within some kind of “sense” of them: perception, com-
mon sense, scientific knowledge, practical use, moral commitment, aesthetic experience, 
etc. Of all these kinds of experiencing things, however, scientific knowledge holds a posi-
tion of prominence, in the sense that ultimately something is “real” exactly as science takes 
it to be. 
2) Since things are given within the knowledge of them, the a priori principles of cogni-
tion determine the things as given. Kant distinguished between two types of a priori princi-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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ples, the “constitutive” and the “regulative” ones. The constitutive principles determine the 
basic features and laws of a certain domain of phenomena, and are expressed by synthetic a 
priori judgments. In particular, Kant claimed that the fundamental statements of Euclidean 
geometry and Newtonian physics were synthetic a priori judgments expressing the a priori 
constitutive principles of natural phenomena. During the late 19
th and early 20
th century the 
success of non-Euclidean geometries and of A. Einstein’s theory of relativity challenged 
Kant’s claim and, more generally, undermined his concept of constitutive principles. As re-
gards the regulative principles, they are epistemic criteria that guide scientific research and 
hence shape the development of science. Marburg Neo-Kantianism plays down the constitu-
tive principles, focuses on the regulative principles of cognition, and sees in the actual his-
tory of science an a posteriori manifestation of them. Cohen, for example, affirms that “we 
objectify […] reason in science” (Cohen 1984 [1883]: 6, my translation). 
3) What Cohen calls “the fact of science” therefore becomes the starting point for any 
epistemological investigation regarding the principles that regulate the process of scientific 
knowledge. With reference to economic science, this means that a Marburg-inspired epis-
temology aims to understand economics as it developed and as it is, without dispensing pre-
scriptions on how economics should be done, without attempting to decide whether eco-
nomics meets some alleged “right” methodological rule, and without dealing with demarca-
tion issues (“Is economics really a science?”) of a positivistic flavor. In this sense, the Mar-
burg approach to science is quite in accord with what in contemporary epistemology is 
called the “naturalistic approach”
5
. 
4) What are then the principles that regulate the process of scientific knowledge? Ac-
cording to Marburg Neo-Kantianism, the scientific understanding basically endeavors to 
make experience intelligible by rationalizing the diverse features of a phenomenon as the 
outcome of as few explanatory factors as possible. Scientific thought reconstructs a phe-
nomenon at the conceptual level by connecting its diverse elements in an ordered and exact 
network of entailment relations, so that what happens in any circumstance is wholly deter-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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mined by the theory itself. In the terminology previously introduced, scientific thought pri-
marily attempts to get a systematic theory of the phenomena under investigation. 
5) This implies that the first goal of scientific understanding is not to attain a perfect 
copy of what is presented in the kinds of experiences (perception, common sense, etc.) that 
precede scientific knowledge. In its fundamental tendency to design a systematic unity of 
the given, theoretical thought can lose the characteristics of things as they are immediately 
offered in pre-scientific experiences. In particular, scientific concepts need not correspond 
to objects of perception or common sense, nor need they be abstractions maintaining the es-
sential features of the “real world”. Consistence with common sense is not the right crite-
rion to evaluate scientific concepts since they are products of thought through which under-
standing reconstructs experience as a system of dependencies and so makes it intelligible 
(cf. e.g. Cassirer 1953 [1910]: 156 ff., 302 ff.). 
6) It is worth noting that there is some affinity between the instrumentalist viewpoint, 
which in economics is usually associated with the positions of Milton Friedman and Fritz 
Machlup, and the Marburg perspective
6
. Both epistemological views acknowledge that, in 
the first instance, scientific theories do not aim to be exact copies of “reality”. However, 
there is also an essential difference between the instrumentalist fictionalism and the Mar-
burg cognitive fictionalism, since the former regards a theory as a useful tool for practical 
ends (typically for empirical prediction), whereas the latter regards a theory as primarily 
useful for cognitive ends, that is, in order to make experience intelligible. In particular, 
Friedman’s position is most distant from the Marburg one since Friedman rather univocally 
stresses the idea that scientific theories are tools used to make predictions, and famously 
claims that “in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic [its] assump-
tion” (Friedman 1953: 14). This thesis regarding the unrealism of assumptions is alien to 
the Marburg view, which simply claims that assumptions can be unrealistic if they make it 
possible to obtain a systematic picture of the phenomenon at issue. Machlup is less distant 
from the Marburg view since he does not even mention the unrealism-of-assumptions the-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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sis, and points out that theories serve not only for prediction but also “as an instrument of 
explanation” (Machlup 1955: 12). 
7) It is also noteworthy that the Marburg epistemological view does not prescribe what 
the “right” theory for a particular field of phenomena should be. As a matter of fact, the in-
tellectual pursuit of a systematic synthesis of a given domain is just a formal one, which 
produces scientific systems with different contents. Therefore, two divergent theories of a 
certain phenomenal domain can coexist if they both connect the diverse elements of the 
domain in an evenly ordered and exact system of entailment relations. Conversely, if the 
system of dependencies set forth by one theory is more complete than the one set forth by 
another, scientific understanding will endorse the former. 
8) The idea that there can be a multiplicity of theories to give the manifold phenomena a 
synthetic unity links the Marburg epistemology to the conventionalism of H. Poincaré 
(1902) and especially of P. Duhem (1906). In fact, the Marburg view shares with Duhem’s 
conventionalism the concept of scientific theories as systematic wholes, whose parts cannot 
be separately subject to empirical verification, and the subsequent idea that a theory can be 
evaluated simply with reference to another theory and not with reference to the observa-
tional data alone. 
9) A last specification is necessary. In economic methodology the label “Neo-Kantian” is 
sometimes attributed to L. von Mises’ approach to economic theory
7
. Mises (1949) claims 
to derive economic propositions from a basic statement regarding human action, namely 
that men consciously act in order to attain their goals. In particular, Mises claims that this 
statement about human action is a synthetic a priori judgment in a Kantian sense. Mises’ 
doctrine bears little relationship to the Marburg epistemology. Basically, whereas the for-
mer is a theory of action and ultimately of economic phenomena, the latter is a theory of 
knowledge. Moreover, whereas Mises invokes the action as the a priori constitutive princi-
ple of the economic domain, the Marburg approach refers only to the regulative principles 
of scientific cognition and is quite suspicious about claims concerning constitutive princi-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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ples. Indeed, such claims implicitly prescribe what the right theory for a certain domain 
should be, and often end up being discounted by subsequent scientific developments, as in 
the case of Kant’s claims on Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. 
The Marburg theory of knowledge just outlined offers a philosophical justification for 
what I claimed is the main factual rule characterizing the development of consumption the-
ory, namely that more realistic assumptions are introduced into the theory only if they do 
not weaken the systematicity of the picture already achieved. According to the Marburg 
view, such a rule is indeed the outcome of the basic regulative principle of the scientific 
understanding, which is to make phenomena intelligible by connecting them in a systematic 
theory even at price of unrealism. I will now examine the history of consumption analysis, 
trying to show that the rule “more realism, but without loss of systematicity” actually regu-
lates its development. 
 
2. From the additive to the general utility function 
2.1 The additively separable utility function 
At the starting point of the present narrative are the theories of Menger (1871), Jevons 
(1871) and L. Walras (1874), since these authors lay down the basic marginalist framework 
on which neoclassical consumer demand theory was subsequently built
8
. According to 
Menger, Jevons and Walras, the economic value of a commodity depends on the evaluation 
that the subjects give to its marginal units. This evaluation is called “final degree of utility” 
by Jevons, “Grenznutzen” by the Austrian School, “rareté” by Walras and then simply 
“marginal utility”. Even though Jevons acknowledges that utility is not measurable, he first 
writes total utility as a cardinal function  () x u  of the quantity consumed of the good, and 
marginal utility as the function obtained by differentiating total utility. In addition, Jevons 
assumes that marginal utility is a positive and decreasing function, and that total utility is an 
additively separable function. This last assumption means that, if more commodities are 
consumed, the total utility obtained from any one of them is independent of the quantities This draft: April 27, 2005 
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consumed of all the others or, in other words, that the marginal utility of a commodity de-
pends only on the quantity consumed of that commodity
9
. Based on these hypotheses about 
total utility (additively separable) and marginal utility (positive and decreasing), Jevons ob-
tains his famous “equations of exchange” for the two commodities/two agents case. The 
equations state that, for the maximization of the traders’ utility under the budget constraints 
and without trades at disequilibrium exchange ratios, for each agent the ratio between the 
marginal utilities of the commodities must be equal to the exchange ratio between the 
commodities (Jevons 1871: 95 ff.). 
Based on the same assumptions as Jevons, in the Élements Walras systematizes the sub-
jective value theory in a coherent and general price theory, and first fixes the exact relation-
ship between the marginal utility of a good and its demand (Walras 1874: 77 ff.). In his 
Mathematical Psychics, F.Y. Edgeworth introduces into the theory a more general utility 
function, that is, a function that need not be an additively separable one. This “general” 
function would make it possible to capture the apparent phenomenon of the utility interde-
pendence of goods (Edgeworth 1881: 20, 104). In order to analyze the exchange when utili-
ties are interdependent, Edgeworth also invented the indifference lines. 
 
2.2. Problems with the general utility function 
However, introducing a general utility function represents a tricky theoretical problem. In 
fact, the assumption that the marginal utility of any commodity is positive, decreasing, and 
depends only on the quantity consumed of that commodity makes it possible to univocally 
determine the relationships between the demand for goods and their prices, as well as en-
sure that the second order conditions for the constrained maximization of utility are satis-
fied
10
. As regards the first issue, if the utilities of the goods are independent, the demand for 
a good definitely decreases (increases) as its price rises (falls) (i.e.  0 < ∂ ∂ i i p x ). In other 
words, with additive utility the so-called “law of demand” holds, and demand curves are 
always downward sloping. With a general utility function this is no longer univocally true: This draft: April 27, 2005 
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demand for a good might also increase as its price rises (this is what will be called the 
Giffen case)
11
. As regards the utility maximization, additive utility together with positive 
and decreasing marginal utility ensure that the second order conditions for the constrained 
maximization problem of the agent’s utility are satisfied. Therefore, if all commodities are 
purchased, first order conditions are sufficient for a maximum. In geometrical terms, Jev-
ons’ assumptions imply that the agent’s indifference curves are strictly convex, so that tan-
gency conditions are sufficient to discover the optimal combination of commodities. With a 
general utility function, this is no longer true. Even with decreasing marginal utilities, plau-
sible substitution relationships between commodities could cause indifference curves to be 
concave, so that a point that satisfies the tangency conditions can also be of minimum, not 
maximum, utility (in the literature of the period such points are called “unstable equilib-
ria”). Moreover, if the indifference curves are convex in some tracts and concave in others, 
there can be not one, but a multiplicity of tangency points, some of maximum and others of 
minimum utility. 
Edgeworth aims to introduce a general utility function, but without losing the convexity 
of indifference curves. Therefore, introducing a general utility function raises two prob-
lems: that of providing the analytical condition for convexity (i.e. the second order condi-
tion for the constrained maximization problem), and that of justifying why such condition 
should hold. Edgeworth (1881: 34 ff. and 108 ff.) provides the condition at issue for the 
two-commodities case, and claims that it is, by and large, satisfied, albeit with a deceptive 
argument
12
. As regards the sign of  i i p x ∂ ∂  in a non-additive framework, Edgeworth does 
not investigate such an issue. In conclusion, Edgeworth draws attention to the unrealistic 
nature of the additive utility assumption (unrealistic in the sense that it is at odds with the 
commonsensical perception of the utility interdependence of commodities), but does not 
solve all the analytical problems raised by the adoption of general utility. 
In this state of affairs, the introduction of the more realistic general utility function into 
the hypotheses of the theory would have caused the loss of the determinateness of the de-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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pendencies between demand and prices obtained by Jevons and Walras. With a general util-
ity function the demand curve can be downward or upward sloping (as well as horizontal) 
and indifference curves can be convex or concave. This larger set of possible implications 
appears desirable just to the extent to which it is possible to understand and exactly deter-
mine under which theoretical circumstances each case occurs, otherwise the theory loses its 
explanatory power and vacuously states that “anything can occur”. 
The determinants of  i i p x ∂ ∂  and the analytical conditions for convex indifference curves 
in a non-additive framework will become clear with the works of V. Pareto, W.E. Johnson 
and E. Slutsky at the beginning of the 20th century. Until that moment, introducing general 
utility just means introducing unpredictability and indetermination into the picture. Accord-
ing to the Marburg epistemological theory, economics is expected to hold to the systematic 
theory based on the unrealistic additive utility assumption until the difficulties raised by the 
introduction of general utility are resolved. And this is what happens. 
 
2.3 Marshall’s demand theory 
Marshall basically rejects Edgeworth’s suggestion of a general utility function and never 
utilizes indifference lines which are the typical analytical tools that make it possible to take 
into account the interdependence of commodity utilities. In all the editions of the Principles 
(1890-1920), Marshall’s consumption theory relies on the additive utility assumption in a 
crucial, though subtle, way. Without this assumption, “the one universal rule to which the 
demand curve conforms [i.e.] that it is inclined negatively throughout the whole of its 
length” (Marshall 1961: 99, note) breaks down. However, this means that Marshall’s partial 
equilibrium analysis, based on the intersection of a downward sloping demand curve and of 
an upward sloping supply curve, falters. As regards the admission of the interdependence of 
utilities, Marshall’s attitude is therefore rather inconsistent. Although in the first edition of 
the Principles (1890), he explicitly deals with rival commodities, in the second edition 
(1891) he tries to defend the additive utility assumption against Edgeworth (Marshall 1961: This draft: April 27, 2005 
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845). Subsequently, in the third edition (1895), he openly admits that “we cannot say that 
the total utility of [two commodities which contribute to the same purpose] is equal to the 
sum of the total utilities of each separately” and afterwards introduces the Giffen goods 
case. This can be explained only if the additive utility assumption is removed, but fortu-
nately such a case is “rare” (Marshall 1961: 131 f.). These are all surface adjustments which 
do not modify the analytical groundwork of Marshall’s demand theory, which continues to 




Apart from the question of additive utility, Marshall is a noteworthy figure in our narra-
tive because he introduces a way of dealing with consumption theory, different from that of 
Jevons, Walras and Edgeworth. First, Marshall considers purchasing by an isolated agent 
rather than the exchange among many agents. Second, consumer prices are fixed by the 
market and are not the result of the exchange process. Third, the household does not have 
an endowment of commodities to trade but a monetary endowment with which to purchase 
commodities. In this way, Marshall limits consumption analysis to the current boundaries 
and separates exchange theory from consumption theory. 
 
2.4 The situation in the 1890s 
In the 1890s, in addition to the unrealistic nature of the additive utility assumption, another 
serious limitation of the classical utilitarian theory is highlighted: the absence of a measure 
of utility. It is not at all clear what the values that the function  () x u  associates to the com-
modity quantities x mean, how these values could be measured, or, least of all, what the unit 
of measure of utility is. In his Mathematical Investigation, I. Fisher tries to find an empiri-
cal measure of utility based on the economic choices of agents. Nevertheless, Fisher’s at-
tempt also collides with utility non-additivity: he himself recognizes that his method of 
measurement works only if commodity utilities are independent (Fisher 1926 [1892]: 64-7). 
G. Cassel also attempts to overcome the problems related to utility by adopting an alterna-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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tive demand theory independent from the utility notion, but obtains no satisfactory results 
(Cassel 1899: 413 ff.). 
Therefore, at the end of the 19
th century, the unrealistic character of the classical – addi-
tive, cardinal – utility is quite clear. Classical utility is unrealistic in at least three ways: i) as 
an assumption in itself, since the utilities of commodities appear to be interdependent; ii) 
for its empirical implications, which conflict with Giffen goods; iii) in the sense that it does 
not correspond to anything actually measurable. However, despite the recognized unrealis-
tic character of classical utility, the neoclassical economists of the period hold to it. The 
subsequent editions of Walras’ Élements (1889-1900) follow the first on this critical point. 
As already mentioned, not even Marshall changes the groundwork for his theory in the sub-
sequent editions of the Principles. P.H. Wicksteed (1888), K. Wicksell (1893), E. Barone 
(1894) and, although in a non-mathematically explicit form, M. Pantaleoni (1889 and 





2.5 The method of successive approximations 
The Marburg explanation for this state of affairs is that the neoclassical economists of the 
end of the 19
th century hold themselves to the unrealistic classical utility since it allows 
them to construct a systematic theory of consumer demand. In this case, the commitment to 
realism conflicts with the commitment to systematicity, and the latter prevails. This does 
not mean that grasping the observed phenomena ceases to be the task of these economists. 
The point is that this understanding must be a theoretical one, that is, the phenomena at is-
sue (e.g. those related to the individual demand of commodities) have to be understood in a 
system of exact entailment relations. If, however, capturing empirical evidence requires the 
introduction of assumptions that preclude precise theoretical implications and open the door 
to an “anything goes” theory, then they are temporarily put aside. This draft: April 27, 2005 
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The method of successive approximations basically consists in this effort of “approxi-
mating” the available evidence as much as possible by means of successive theories based 
on progressively more realistic assumptions which must not, however, blur the theoretical 
system. Neoclassical economists have repeatedly upheld such a method in response to the 
criticisms of the lack of realism and empirical relevance often addressed to them by the 
German Historical School, the American Institutionalists and other heterodox schools. The 
Marburg theory of knowledge legitimizes the successive approximation method by tracing 
it back to the regulative principles of scientific understanding, and, accordingly, offers a 
vindication of neoclassical economists’ methodological common sense. 
 
2.6 Pareto’s step forward 
In his first cardinalist phase, Pareto builds up a general utility analysis more comprehensive 
than those of his predecessors, without, however, using his own results. In fact, in the five-
part article, “Considerazioni” he recognizes the soundness of Edgeworth’s generalization, 
states the exchange analysis in general terms, but then develops it within the additive 
framework (Pareto 1892-93, parts I-III). He subsequently resumes the general utility analy-
sis and first provides the exact expression of  i i p x ∂ ∂  in the general utility case and for any 
number of goods, but then continues by using the additive utility which he declares “ap-
proximately true” (Pareto 1892-93, part V: 306-7)
15
. Similarly, in the Cours, Pareto devel-
ops the entire analysis with additive utility functions and discusses the general case only in 
a footnote (Pareto 1896-97: 332-4). After 1900 Pareto changes his approach to the topic. In 
the Manual of Political Economy (Italian edition 1906; French edition 1909) he recognizes 
that the additive assumption is an approximation made “in order to simplify the problems” 
but affirms that “it is time now to take a step forward and also consider the case in which 
the ophelimity of a good depends on the consumption of all other goods” (cf. Pareto 1906: 
241, and 1909: 253)
16
. This draft: April 27, 2005 
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Accordingly, in the Appendix to the Manual, Pareto provides a sufficient condition for 
the convexity of the indifference curves in the general two-commodity case. Besides, he 
discusses what sort of relationships between the commodities support the condition at issue, 
and points out that it is surely fulfilled when the utilities of the commodities are independ-
ent (cf. Pareto 1906: 504 ff., and 1909: 572 ff., 651 ff). He also provides a different, suffi-
cient convexity condition in the case with any number of goods (Pareto 1906: 550, and 
1909: 577). Moreover, in the Appendix to the French edition of his work, Pareto reintro-
duces the general expression of  i i p x ∂ ∂  that he already obtained in his 1892 “Considerazi-
oni” (cf. Pareto 1909: 580-1)
17
. Although Pareto’s conditions for convexity are too strong 
and the economic meaning of the Paretian formula for  i i p x ∂ ∂  is not clear, these results of-
fer the first satisfactory solution to the problems induced by a general utility function. The 
sufficient conditions for convexity identify a set of theoretical circumstances which ensure 
that a commodity bundle actually is of maximum utility, and the analytical expression of 
i i p x ∂ ∂  makes it possible to state when the law of demand holds. 
The impact of Pareto’s non-additive treatment is quite apparent in the literature of the 
period. At the very beginning of the 20
th century, the contributions in demand theory were 
still developed within the additive framework, as the works of A. Aupetit (1901), C. Colson 
(1901), U. Ricci (1904), P. Boninsegni (1904), A.W. Flux (1904) and H. Cunynghame 
(1904) show. After the publication of Pareto’s Manual (particularly the French edition), 
general utility became the starting point of the analysis. In the 1910s the main contributions 
that built on consumption theory in a general utility framework were those of Johnson 
(1913) and, above all, Slutsky (1915). 
 
2.7 The completion of general utility analysis: Johnson and Slutsky 
Johnson analyzes the effects on demand of a variation in individual income as well as in 
commodity prices in the two-commodity case
18
. At a geometrical level, he constructs the in-
come-consumption curve as well as the price-consumption one. At a mathematical level, he This draft: April 27, 2005 
  16 
provides an analytical treatment of “the case in which an increased price leads to an in-
crease of the amount of the commodity bought (i.e. [the] Giffen’s paradox)” (Johnson 
1913: 484) and demonstrates that the Giffen goods are a subset of the inferior goods. 
The definitive systematization of consumer demand theory in a general utility framework 
is accomplished by Slutsky. In 1915, Slutsky publishes his fundamental article in the Gior-
nale degli Economisti, the Italian journal where Pareto had published most of his contribu-
tions
19
. However, as is well known, Slutsky’s paper will remain basically ignored until the 
1930s (see below). In his article, Slutsky provides the following results for any number of 
goods and for a general utility function (cf. Slutsky 1915: 4-19): 
1) The second order, necessary and sufficient conditions for the constrained maximiza-
tion of utility. 
2) The exact mathematical expressions of  j i p x ∂ ∂ ,  i i p x ∂ ∂ and  I xi ∂ ∂ . 
3) By introducing the notion of “compensated variation of price”, Slutsky (1915: 14) de-
composes the effect of a price change on the demand for goods into the part due to the sub-
stitution effect  i p i x ∂ ∂ ˆ ˆ  and into the one due to the income effect, thereby obtaining what 
will be called “The Slutsky Equation”
 20
. 
4) If the second order condition is satisfied, the substitution effect is always non-positive. 
That means that for the compensated demand, the “law of demand” holds. 
5) The compensated variations of the demand for good i when the price of commodity j 
varies, that is, the cross-price substitution effect  j i p x ∂ ∂ ˆ ˆ , is symmetric. If we call “substitu-
tion matrix” the matrix of the terms  j i p x ∂ ∂ ˆ ˆ , this means that the substitution matrix of the 
demand function is symmetric. Moreover, if the second order condition holds, the substitu-
tion matrix is negative semi-definite
21
. 
6) Although the substitution effect is always non-positive, the income effect can be either 
negative or positive and the Giffen case is due to a positive income effect which is greater 
in absolute value than the substitution effect. This draft: April 27, 2005 
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The works of Pareto, Johnson and, after its re-discovery, of Slutsky show that the intro-
duction of general utility does not imply introducing unpredictability into the theoretical 
picture of consumer demand. It becomes clear that not only with additive utility but also 
with general utility it is possible to specify in all theoretical circumstances the exact condi-
tions for the maximization of consumer utility, as well as to determine the precise interrela-
tions between demand, prices, and income. Indeed, in the 1910s general utility became the 
standard whereas additive utility became a special case, as the works of Wicksteed (1910), 
G. Borgatta (1911-12a and 1911-12b), A. Osorio (1913) and W. Zawadzki (1914) show. 
 
2.8 The acceptance of general utility and the Marburg epistemological view 
The story of the acceptance in consumer demand theory of a general utility function cor-
roborates the Marburg-inspired claim that the rule “more realism, but without loss of sys-
tematicity” actually regulates the development of consumption analysis. Let us sum up this 
story. In the 1870s Jevons and Walras elaborated a systematic exchange and demand theory 
that crucially depended on the additive utility assumption. In 1881 Edgeworth pointed out 
the unrealistic character of this assumption, but did not elaborate an evenly systematic the-
ory based on the more realistic assumption of general utility. The problems related to the 
introduction of general utility were resolved about 30 years later by Pareto, Johnson, and 
Slutsky. In the meanwhile, neoclassical economists generally recognized that the additive 
utility assumption was unrealistic, but held to it in all their works (cf. the works listed at the 
end of Sections 2.4 and 2.6). Only when Pareto, Johnson, and Slutsky showed how to con-
struct a systematic theory of consumer demand in a general utility framework did general 
utility supersede additive utility as the standard assumption in consumption analysis. This draft: April 27, 2005 
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3. Superseding the cardinal utility framework 
3.1 Pareto the behaviorist, Pareto the utilitarian 
Pareto is not usually remembered for having introduced a general utility function in demand 
theory, but for his landmark attempt to restate consumer equilibrium analysis without refer-
ence to cardinally measurable utility, whose empirical meaning appeared highly problem-
atic at the turn of the 20
th century. Such an attempt – the so called “Paretian revolution” – is 
carried out by Pareto after 1900 along two different lines of attack. According to the behav-
iorist approach, outlined in the “Sunto” (Pareto 1900), every hint of utility has to be set 
aside, and demand theory should be based only on the observable consumer choice behav-
iour. According to the ordinalist approach, more evident in the Manual, economic theory 
can still be based on utility, which is nonetheless regarded as a ranking index with just an 
ordinal meaning. From a mathematical viewpoint, this is tantamount to saying that a general 
utility function is unique only up to a strictly increasing transformation of it. 
Pareto’s post-1900 work is as rich as it is ambiguous, and actually includes both the be-
haviorist and the ordinalist approach. However, as observed by many authors from the 
1930s on, Pareto’s superseding of cardinal utility appears problematic on both fronts: his 
behaviorist demand theory actually implies many implicit references to utility, and such ref-
erences are not only to ordinal but also to cardinal utility
22
. For example, utilitarian elements 
are evident in the way Pareto-as-behaviorist justifies convexity and the negative slope of 
indifference curves. He also refers to decreasing marginal utility, even if the sign of the sec-
ond-order derivative is not invariant with respect to a monotone transformation of the utility 
function
23
. Similarly, the notion of complementary goods in terms of second-order cross-
partial derivatives that Pareto shares with R. Auspitz and R. Lieben (1889) as well as with 
Edgeworth (1897), is cardinal
24
. As regards additivity, Pareto (1906: 501) points out that 
this is in fact a cardinal property of utility functions: a generic monotone transformation can 
convert an additive utility function into a non-additive utility function, and only linear trans-
formations preserve additive separability. Still, on some occasions Pareto keeps assigning a This draft: April 27, 2005 
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special status to additive utility functions
25
. Lastly, Pareto does not examine the question of 
whether the second order conditions for the utility maximization and the formula for  i i p x ∂ ∂  




The contributions of Allen, Hicks and Samuelson in the 1930s all aim to carry out the 
Paretian revolution in demand theory by solving the problems the Italian economist left 
open. In their attempts to supersede cardinal utility, such economists follow one of the two 
approaches originally delineated by Pareto: Hicks and Allen in their joint paper as well as 
Samuelson adopt the behaviorist approach, whereas Hicks in Value and Capital adopts the 
utilitarian-ordinalist one. Before discussing the celebrated developments of the 1930s, I will 
briefly survey the works that appeared in the 1910s and 1920s, with special attention to 
their cardinal or ordinal character. 
 
3.2 Ordinal insights, cardinal treatments 
Returning to Johnson’s and Slutsky’s papers, although they contain important ordinal in-
sights, many cardinal concepts remain in them. In his paper, Johnson points out the non-
cardinal nature of the indifference map and observes that consumption theory does not need 
to know the marginal utility of a commodity but only the ratio of one marginal utility to an-
other. However, he also talks about “equal additional increments of net utility” stemming 
from the continually increasing acquisition of a good (Johnson 1913: 485), and attributes 
meaning to the distance between indifference curves. Moreover, he makes assumptions re-
garding the sign and the magnitude of the second-order and cross-partial derivatives of the 
utility function without seeming to realize that these properties are not invariant to an 
increasing transformation of the utility function (cf. Johnson 1913: 490 ff.). 
As for Slutsky, he takes Pareto’s Manual as the starting point of his analysis and en-
dorses the Paretian definition of utility as a purely ordinal index. Slutsky is interested in the 
empirical implications of the utility analysis, and in particular he seeks to determine the This draft: April 27, 2005 
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sign of  i x u
2 2 ∂ ∂  and of  () j i x x x u ∂ ∂ ∂
2
 starting from the empirically observable values of 
j i p x ∂ ∂ ,  i p i x ∂ ∂ ˆ ˆ  and  I xi ∂ ∂ . However, he comes to the conclusion that “it is impossible to 
deduce from the facts of conduct the character (that is, the sign) of the second derivatives of 
utility” (Slutsky 1915: 25), and recognizes that the traditional definition of complementar-
ity,  i.e. the Auspitz–Lieben–Edgeworth–Pareto definition, cannot be justified within a 
purely ordinal framework. He then suggests that the subjects may be able to tell whether 
two goods are complementary by means of “internal evidence” (Slutsky 1915: 25). Slutsky 
briefly discusses the empirical implications of this hypothesis which, however, is cardinal 
in nature. Furthermore, despite the fact Slutsky carries out all his analysis in terms of the 
second-order and cross-partial derivatives of the utility function, he does not attempt to ver-
ify whether the results obtained are invariant to an increasing transformation of the utility 
function. 
In 1924, A.L. Bowley publishes his Mathematical Groundwork of Economics in which 
he attempts “to reduce to a uniform notation, and to present as a properly related whole” the 
main parts of the mathematical utility theories elaborated “by Cournot, Jevons, Pareto, 
Edgeworth, Marshall, Pigou, and Johnson” (Bowley 1924: v)
27
. Bowley’s work presents one 
of the most comprehensive mathematical treatments of consumer demand theory of the 
1920s. It also contains some ordinal insights, which however are not fully worked out. In 
fact, on the one hand, he explicitly points out that propositions depending on the sign or 
magnitude of the second-order derivative of the utility function embody the assumption that 
utility is cardinally measurable (Bowley 1924: 2). Accordingly, among the results obtained, 
he clearly indicates those which rely on assumptions about the utility second-order deriva-
tives, namely those regarding the sign of  i i p x ∂ ∂  (cf. Bowley 1924: 13, 15, 55-6). On the 
other hand, he maintains the cardinal notions of complementarity and substitutability in 
terms of the sign of  () j i x x x u ∂ ∂ ∂
2
 and does not examine what happens in an ordinal frame-
work to the formula  i i p x ∂ ∂ . This draft: April 27, 2005 
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Other major contributions of the period 1920-33 either continue consumer demand 
analysis in an explicitly cardinal framework or contain some ordinal insights, which are not 
suitably exploited. The main examples are L. Amoroso (1921 and 1928), P. Boninsegni 
(1925), M. Fanno (1925-26), R. Frisch (1926), A. de Pietri-Tonelli (1927), F. Divisia 
(1928), G.C. Evans (1930), O. Weinberger (1930), A. Bordin (1932), V. Dominedò (1933) 
and H. Schultz (1933). 
 
3.3 Hicks, Allen and the marginal rate of substitution 
In 1934, Hicks and Allen publish a famous paper which aims to work out a theory of con-
sumption choices along a Paretian line but “free of the inconsistencies detected in Pareto” 
(Hicks–Allen 1934: 55). Even though widespread interpretation puts the Hicks–Allen paper 
at the origin of utilitarian ordinalism, it belongs to the behaviorist camp: in fact, they start 
by admitting the cardinal immeasurability of utility and note that “if total utility is not quan-
titatively definable, neither is marginal utility” (Hicks–Allen 1934: 55). Hicks and Allen do 
not replace total and marginal utility with ordinal utility, but with the marginal rate of sub-
stitution (MRS). The MRS, defined as the amount of good j which substitutes a marginal 
unit of good i for the individual, is a quantitatively definable entity which can be empiri-
cally observed, and whose notion is independent from the notion of utility. Starting from 
the MRS, Hicks and Allen: 1) determine the relationships between the demand for goods, 
their price, and the consumer income in elasticity terms; 2) decompose the effect of a price 
change on demand, into income and substitution effect; 3) provide a new, non-cardinal 
definition of complementary and competitive goods which is equivalent to the current stan-
dard definition in terms of the cross effect of a compensated price change. 
A problem with the Hicks-Allen construction is that all their results rely on two crucial 
assumptions: first, that the MRS is negative (which means decreasing indifference curves) 
and second, that the MRS is decreasing (which means convex indifference curves). As in 
the case of Pareto’s behavioral approach, the tricky issue is that of justifying such assump-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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tions without any reference to utility or psychological concepts. As to the first item, Hicks 
and Allen postulate the MRS negativity without any particular explanation. This statement 
can seem natural only on the basis of an unspoken endorsement of the hedonistic non-
satiation principle. With reference to the decreasing MRS assumption, Hicks and Allen only 
assert that it is not falsified by experience, without putting forward any positive justification 
for it. Therefore, as Samuelson (1938: 61-2) will promptly underline, the convexity hy-
pothesis once more seems ultimately to rely on psychological-utilitarian considerations. 
In the end, this third attempt (after those of Cassel and Pareto) to set aside every refer-
ence to utility does not succeed. The Hicks-Allen restatement of consumer theory in terms 
of the MRS fails to become the standard neoclassical one for two reasons. From a methodo-
logical standpoint, the superseding of the utility notion appears debatable since the crucial 
assumptions of the MRS rely on postulations that are utilitarian in nature. In spite of this, 
the Hicks-Allen paper presents the most advanced results on the relationships between 
price, income and demand from a theoretical viewpoint. However, with the rediscovery of 
Slutsky’s article and with the publication of Value and Capital by Hicks in 1939, it be-
comes clear that the results obtained on the basis of the MRS can be obtained through ordi-
nal utilities in a much simpler way. Therefore, there are no methodological or theoretical 
reasons to adopt the Hicks-Allen approach, and it is indeed thereafter abandoned. 
 
3.4 Hicks the orderer 
At the beginning of the 1930s, Slutsky’s fundamental article is rediscovered: Dominedò 
(1933) in Italy, and later Schultz (1935) and Allen (1936) call attention to it
28
. In particular, 
Allen shows that Slutsky’s results are independent from cardinal measurability assumptions 
on utility and can be obtained entirely within an ordinalist framework (Allen 1936: 191-2). 
This opens the way to the ordinalist restatement of Slutsky’s findings and to the formulation 
of the standard ordinalist neoclassical consumer theory. This draft: April 27, 2005 
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Although for a while Allen (1938: 344 ff.) continues to maintain consumer choice analy-
sis in terms of the MRS as a primary concept, Hicks in 1937 has already set forth consumer 
theory in terms of ordinal utility (Hicks 1937) and fine-tunes his formulation in Value and 
Capital (1939). In this work, the MRS ceases to be the basic element of the model and is 
regarded as the opposite of the ratio between the partial derivatives of the ordinal utility 
function. In any case, the required features for the MRS are the same as in the paper written 
together with Allen: the MRS has to be negative and decreasing. Negativity is still upheld 
on the basis of the principle of nonsatiation which makes marginal utilities positive. The 
case for the decreasing MRS is more complex than in the article written with Allen but re-
mains basically the same: the assumption of a decreasing MRS (i.e. of indifference curve 
convexity) is required for the determinateness of the theory and does not seem to be dis-
proven by experience (Hicks 1939: 13 ff.). In the end, Hicks re-presents Slutsky’s results in 
a systematic and mathematically clear way, and demonstrates, more thoroughly than Allen 
and Schultz, how these findings are invariant to strictly increasing transformations of a gen-
eral utility function. After Value and Capital, the Slutsky-Hicks ordinal theory becomes the 
standard one in consumer demand analysis. 
 
3.5 The introduction of ordinal utility and the Marburg epistemological view 
The story of the introduction into consumer demand theory of ordinal utility also seems to 
be well rationalized by the Marburg epistemology. Let us recapitulate this story. From the 
1890s on, the cardinal measurability of utility which underpins the theories of Jevons, Wal-
ras, Edgeworth and Marshall began to appear as an unrealistic assumption to neoclassical 
economists. Cardinal utility looked unrealistic since it did not seem to correspond to any-
thing empirically observable. Attempts to find a cardinal measure of utility (Fisher) or to 
develop an alternative demand theory independent from the utility notion (Cassel) failed. In 
this state of affairs, removing the assumption of cardinal measurability of utility meant un-
dermining the existing theoretical construction without having a practicable alternative. Ac-This draft: April 27, 2005 
  24 
cording to the Marburg view, neoclassical economists were then expected to stick temporar-
ily to cardinal utility, and this is what in fact happened until the publication of Pareto’s 
Manual (cf. the works listed at the end of Sections 2.4 and 2.6). 
In the Manual, Pareto elaborated a quite systematic analysis of consumer equilibrium in 
an ordinal framework. However, he did not solve all the problems raised by the superseding 
of cardinal utility. In this situation, still characterized by a certain theoretical ambiguity, the 
main books and papers published after the Manual (cf. the listings at the end of Sections 2.7 
and 3.2) either simply held to the cardinal framework, or contained some ordinal insights 
which nonetheless were not worked out. After 1934 the rediscovery of Slutsky’s paper and 
the contributions of Allen and Hicks showed that the introduction of ordinal utility did not 
imply introducing unpredictability into the theoretical picture of consumer demand. In fact, 
not only with cardinal utility but also with ordinal utility was it possible to determine ex-
actly the conditions for the utility maximization, the interrelations between demand, prices, 
and income, as well as to set univocally the substitution and complementary relations be-
tween goods. Hence, when it turned out that the cardinal measurability assumption could be 
set aside without any loss of systematicity, the ordinal utility framework became the stan-
dard in consumer demand analysis. 
 
3.6 The Chicago discussion of the Slutsky-Hicks demand theory 
The establishment of the Slutsky-Hicks theory as the new orthodox one is not hindered by 
the fact that it is difficult to apply empirically, as some scholars at the University of Chi-
cago point out. Schultz (1935, 1938) tries to test the empirical implications of Slutsky’s 
analysis by comparing them with the data from the statistical demand curves of some com-
modities. Although Schultz’s findings do not refute Slutsky’s results, they certainly do not 
corroborate them
29
. Other Chicago scholars, such as G.J. Stigler (1939), W.A. Wallis and 
M. Friedman (1942), and F. Knight (1944), subsequently point out the difficulty of recon-
ciling the demand curves of the ordinal Slutsky-Hicks theory with the statistical demand This draft: April 27, 2005 
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curves. In particular, Wallis and Friedman question the possibility of empirically deriving 
the indifference function, either through laboratory experiments, like that performed by L.L. 
Thurstone (1931), or through a statistical estimation
30
. This makes the Slutsky-Hicks 
framework useless for empirical evaluations and for predicting the effect of changes in eco-
nomic conditions on the consumption of various goods (Wallis–Friedman 1942: 177 ff.). 
However, once again these criticisms of lack of realism and empirical relevance have no 
effect. As a matter of fact, neoclassical consumer theory does not take them into account at 
all, and instead develops in two different directions, with divergent aims but a similar ap-
proach. On the one hand, Samuelson strives to obtain analytical results comparable to those 
of Slutsky-Hicks, but on the basis of a set of postulates different from the utilitarian ones. 
On the other hand, first H. Wold and then G. Debreu, maintain the reference to utility but 
seek to rigorously ground the ordinal utility function and its features on an axiomatic theory 
of consumer preference. 
 
3.7 Samuelson and the behaviorist-ordinalist equivalence 
In an often quoted passage from his 1938 note on consumer theory, Samuelson (1938: 71) 
says that he seeks to “develop the theory of consumer behaviour freed from any vestigial 
traces of the utility concept”. This does not mean that Samuelson wants to preclude the in-
troduction of the utility notion or to contradict the results obtained by using related con-
structs (as shown by his work of the late 1930s on welfare economics with A. Bergson), but 
merely that he thinks that consumer behavior analysis “can be carried on more directly […] 
from a different set of postulates” (Samuelson 1938: 62)
31
. In fact, Samuelson (1938, 1947, 
1953) proves that almost all the restrictions on the demand functions that derive from the 
constrained maximization of an ordinal utility function can also be obtained starting from a 
simple coherence assumption on consumer behavior. This assumption is what will be later 
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The only restriction on demand functions that derives from the utility maximization hy-
pothesis but not from the Weak Axiom is the symmetry of the cross-price substitution ef-
fects, i.e. the symmetry of the substitution matrix. This property of the substitution matrix is 
important since it is necessary (together with the matrix’s negative semi-definiteness) for 
the existence of a utility function whose maximization generates the consumption choices 
expressed by a given demand function. The problem of defining under which conditions 
such a generating utility function exists, is the so-called “integrability problem”, first stud-
ied by G.B. Antonelli (1886) and conclusively solved in some of the works collected in 
Chipman et al. (1971)
32
. 
For our purposes, it suffices to say that in 1950 H.S. Houthakker introduces the Strong 
Axiom of Revealed Preference (an iteration of the Weak Axiom, which rules out the possi-
bility of cyclical choices) and shows that it is sufficient for the integrability of demand func-
tions. On the basis of Houthakker’s contribution, Samuelson (1950) proves that the symme-
try and negative semi-definiteness of Slutsky’s substitution matrix are not only necessary 
but also sufficient conditions for the integrability of demand functions (Samuelson 1950: 




In conclusion, it turns out that the Slutsky-Hicks framework and the Samuelson-
Houthakker one lead to identical restrictions on demand functions. This fulfills 
Samuelson’s program of carrying out consumption theory from a non-utilitarian set of pos-
tulates, and at the same time makes the opposition between the ordinalist and the behavior-
ist approach vanish. After 1950 further results showing the substantial equivalence between 
the ordinalist and the behaviorist approaches are obtained by K. Arrow (1959), H. Uzawa 
(1960), M.K. Richter (1971) and others. As a matter of fact, since the 1950s the two ap-
proaches have coexisted in consumer demand analysis. This state of affairs is well in accord 
with the Marburg claim that two different theories can be considered both valid if they con-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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nect the diverse elements of a given domain in an evenly exact system of entailment rela-
tions (see above Section 1, points 7 and 8). 
 
4. Axiomatization and formalism 
4.1 The axiomatic foundation of Slutsky-Hicks’ theory 
From the 1940s on, utilitarian consumer theory strives to find a sounder and more rigorous 
basis for its fundamental analytical tools, preferences and ordinal utility functions. In this 
direction, the pioneering attempt was made by Frisch (1926), but it is Wold who, in 1943-
44, gives the first axiomatic treatment of the utilitarian theory of demand. In particular, 
Wold states axiomatically the general properties of the preference/indifference relations that 
allow us to represent “every indifference map […] as the level map of a continuous, non 
decreasing function” (Wold 1943-44, II: 223). Furthermore, Wold proposes a method to 
construct such a function which is ordinal in nature. Unfortunately, Wold’s analysis is not 
completely correct. 
The axiomatic treatment of preferences spreads into neoclassical economics a very few 
years later through Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, the book written by J. von 
Neumann and O. Morgenstern (1944). Their axiomatic handling of preferences is adopted 
by J. Marschak (1950), employed by Houthakker (1950), and perfected by Arrow (1951). 
Preference is formally conceived as a binary relation between two generic alternatives, 
whose basic properties are “completeness” and “transitivity” (cf. Arrow 1951: 11 ff.). In 
1954, the so-called “paradox of lexicographic preferences” introduced by N. Georgescu-
Roegen (1954) makes it apparent that it is not always possible to define a real valued order-
preserving function on a set of alternatives ordered by the preferences of some agent. In the 
same year, Debreu specifies assumptions under which the representation of a preference or-
dering, by means of a real-valued continuous function, is possible and demonstrates the 
consequential representation theorem (Debreu 1954). In Theory of Value Debreu carries out 
the axiomatic analysis and determines the assumptions on both the consumption set and the This draft: April 27, 2005 
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preference relation which are sufficient to derive a continuous quasi-concave utility func-
tion representing the preferences (Debreu 1959: 52 ff.)
34
. 
Yet, a continuous quasi-concave utility function is exactly the ordinal utility function 
that the Slutsky-Hicks consumer theory needs, since such a function ensures that the second 
order conditions for the constrained maximization of utility are satisfied, i.e. that the indif-
ference curves are convex. In this way, it is possible to recover all the results already ob-
tained by ordinal utility theory, but now starting from a basis fully specified in axiomatic 
terms. Debreu therefore provides the Slutsky-Hicks theory with a sound axiomatic founda-
tion and brings neoclassical consumer theory to its current standard form. 
 
4.2 Formalism as neoclassical methodological awareness 
The axiomatic or formalist method stresses the logical rigor of the theory. In an oft-quoted 
passage of Theory of Value, Debreu peremptorily states that: “Allegiance to rigor dictates 
the axiomatic form of the analysis” (Debreu 1959: x). In another text, Debreu observes that 
the aim of the axiomatization of economic theory is the “full specification of the assump-
tions under which any one of its conclusions is asserted”, and that “the complete specifica-
tion of assumptions, the exact statement of conclusions, and the rigor of the deductions of 
an axiomatized study provide a secure foundation on which the construction of economic 
theory can proceed” (Debreu 1983 [1977]: 5-6). 
From the formalist standpoint, the assumptions of the theory do not aim primarily to 
grasp the features of the “real world” or the “actual human beings”, but have basically a 
logical-systematic function: they are axioms that ensure the determinateness and the con-
nectedness of the theoretical construction. The interpretation and justification of an axiom 
by referring to commonsensical, statistical or experimental evidence (e.g. the psychological 
interpretation of the convexity of the indifference curves as a consequence of the human 
preference for variety) is of secondary import. If an interpretation makes some axiom ap-
pear more realistic, or provides a handy intuition to it, the interpretation is welcome. On the This draft: April 27, 2005 
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contrary, if an axiom appears unacceptably unrealistic, the theorist’s task is to either remove 
it (“to relax the assumptions”) without letting the edifice of the theory collapse, or to re-
place the entire theoretical construction with another one which ought to be comparably 
systematic. Notably, within the axiomatic approach even previously abandoned assump-
tions can be recovered and analyzed as special cases valid under specific conditions. This is 




Now, the methodological tenets of the formalist approach are clearly in accord with 
those of the Marburg view, and the formalist motto “allegiance to rigor” may be easily 
translated in a Neo-Kantian “allegiance to systematicity”. As I have tried to demonstrate, 
however, the priority assigned to the pursuit of systematicity over the pursuit of realism is 
not a formalist novelty. On the contrary, this is the same methodological principle that has 
tacitly guided the development of neoclassical consumer theory from its very beginnings. 
Sometimes it is instead claimed that the formalist approach would have changed the aims 
and epistemic rules of economic science: after World War II economic theory would have 
become more and more directed at achieving internal consistency to the detriment of factual 
relevance; the empirical element would have vanished in economic model-building, and a 
permissive attitude to unrealistic assumptions would have pervaded economic theorizing
36
. 
In our terms, the realism of the theory would have been sacrificed to its systematicity. I dis-
agree with this claim and argue that, at least for consumption theory, no substantial change 
in the epistemic principles of neoclassical analysis took place after World War II: the sacri-
fice of realism on behalf of systematicity has been the rule from the very beginnings of con-
sumption theory. What happened with the formalist approach is not that the epistemic prin-
ciples of neoclassical analysis have changed, but that neoclassical analysis has become 
aware of those which already were its internal epistemic laws, and has followed them more 
consistently. 
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5. Marburg and the other trends in economic methodology 
In this last section I briefly illustrate why some other epistemological theories rationalize 
the history of consumption analysis less persuasively than the Marburg one. A more general 
and thorough confrontation between the Marburg epistemology and the other trends in the 
philosophy of economics will be made in a companion paper. 
As regards the methodologies that apply to economics logical empiricism or Popperian 
falsificationism, they are largely unable to rationalize a history in which the accepted theo-
ries have little empirical relevance and are regularly in contrast with commonsense evi-
dence, observational data or experimental tests. As a consequence, the fundamental attitude 
of such methodologies towards economics is that of complaint and normative advice, which 
however do not appear useful in understanding economic science as it developed over time. 
Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs has surely more affinities with 
the Marburg view. In particular, Lakatos also takes carefully into account the actual history 
of the sciences and maintains that an epistemological theory that fails to rationalize this his-
tory “must be rejected” (Lakatos 1971: 124). However, his notion of progressive series of 
theories does not square with what has been regarded as progress in the history of consumer 
theory, namely the steps from additive to general utility, then from cardinal to ordinal util-
ity, and finally the axiomatic foundation of ordinal utility. According to Lakatos, a theory is 
progressive with respect to another if the former “has some excess empirical content over 
its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact” (Lakatos 1970: 
33). Yet, the theory of consumption based on general utility predicts no novel fact with re-
spect to the theory grounded on additive utility. On the contrary, the general utility appara-
tus accounts for some already known facts (interdependence of commodity utilities, Giffen 
goods, inferior goods) which could not be explained within the additive framework. Simi-
larly, the theory based on ordinal utility has no excess empirical content, but just fits better 
with the perceived non-measurability of utility. Therefore, the development of consumer 
theory seems better rationalized as an endeavor to make intelligible the already known phe-This draft: April 27, 2005 
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nomena related to consumer demand by connecting them in a systematic framework, rather 
than as an attempt to predict some novel, hitherto unexpected fact
37
. 
A similar point holds for the instrumentalist viewpoint. My historical reconstruction sug-
gests that the theories successively accepted as standard in the history of consumption 
analysis provide few empirical predictions and are quite useless for practical ends. There-
fore, it is hard to think of the development of consumption theory as driven by the attempt 
to make reliable predictions of consumer demand.  
Finally, with respect to the methodological trends that attempt to explain the historical 
developments of economic science on the basis of extra-scientific factors – as in the sociol-
ogy or scientific knowledge, the discourse analysis or the economics of scientific knowl-
edge
38
 – I simply contend to have shown that an internal narrative is still a sufficiently pow-
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  See among others Stigler 1950, Houthakker 1961, Chipman 1971, Hurwicz 1971, Ekelund–Furubotn–
Gramm 1972, Samuelson 1974, Chipman 1976, Chipman 1982, Mirowski 1989, Blaug 1992, Ellingsten 
1994, Montesano 1996, Hands–Mirowski 1998, Hurwicz 1998, Mirowski–Hands 1998, Mornati 1999, 
Weber 1999a and 1999b, Mongin 2000, Weber 2001, Mirowski 2002, Chipman–Lenfant 2002, Giocoli 
2003, Montesano 2004. 
2
  Throughout the paper, “utilitarianism” is meant to be related to individual choice theory, not to the social 
choice and ethical doctrine of J. Bentham, J.S. Mill or H. Sidwick. 
3
  U. Mäki (1989) points out that the term “realism” has two different meanings: it designates an ontological 
doctrine about the external world (as opposed, e.g., to idealism), or it is used as an attribute of a scientific 
theory (as in the phrase “the realism of neoclassical economics”). Throughout the paper, I employ the term 
in the latter meaning and always refer to the “realism of a theory.” Mäki suggests reserving the term “real-
ism” for ontological doctrines, and introduces the expression “realisticness” as an attribute of theories. 
However, since the expression “realisticness” has not gained general acceptance, I prefer to maintain the 
more familiar term “realism” to indicate a property of scientific theories. 
4
  For a general introduction to the Neo-Kantian movement, see Ferrari 1997, Ollig 1998, and Michael Fried-
man 2004. Relevant to the questions discussed in this paper are also Michael Friedman 1999, 2000, 2001 
and 2005. 
5
  On the naturalistic approach with particular reference to economics, see Hands 2001: 128 ff. 
6
  The main areas of research of F. Machlup (1902-83) were international monetary economics and industrial 
organization, but he also contributed to the methodology of economics. In particular, Machlup (1946) took 
part in a famous debate on the theory of the firm and defended the neoclassical profit-maximization as-
sumption against the criticisms of lack of realism raised by R.A. Lester (1946). Later on, Machlup (1964) 
critically discussed P. Samuelson’s methodological stance against unrealistic assumptions in economics 
(cf. Samuelson 1963). Machlup showed that Samuelson as a methodologist was contradicting Samuelson 
as a theorist, and argued that Samuelson’s best theoretical work was in fact based on unrealistic assump-
tions. 
7
 See  e.g. Parsons 1990, Barrotta 1996, Parsons 1997 and Hands 2001: 41 ff. 
8
  Shortly before 1871, A. Cournot (1838) developed an articulated theory of demand that, however, was not 
grounded in the utility concept. J. Dupuit (1844) analyzed total and marginal utility, but identified the de-
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mand curve with the marginal utility curve. H.H. Gossen (1854) first observed that, for utility maximiza-
tion, the marginal utility obtained by spending money upon different commodities must be the same, but 
his awkward book was rediscovered only at the end of the 1870s. On the history of demand theory before 
1871, see Stigler 1950 and Ekelund–Furubotn–Gramm 1972. 
9
  In mathematical terms, Jevons postulates that  ( ) () () () n n n x u x u x u x x x u + + + = ... ,..., , 2 2 1 1 2 1 , where  i x  is the 
quantity consumed of commodity i, and  () i i x u  is the total utility function relative to commodity i, with 
n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . The marginal utility of commodity i is given by  i x u ∂ ∂ , which is assumed to be positive 
( 0 > ∂ ∂ i x u ) and decreasing ( 0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ i x u ) for each i. Additive separability implies that, for  j i ≠ , 
0
2 = ∂ ∂ ∂ j i x x u . 
10
  Additive separability of total utility and decreasing marginal utility are not invariant to a strictly increasing 
transformation of the utility function, that is, they both are cardinal and not ordinal properties of the utility 
function. However, the problems related to the ordinal measurability of utility are extraneous to this early 
phase of utility theory and will become relevant only later. See below. 
11
  If the utilities of the goods are independent (and marginal utilities are positive and decreasing), it can also 
be shown that demand for a good definitely increases (decreases) as consumer income I rises (falls). In 
mathematical terms  0 > ∂ ∂ I xi , which means that all goods are normal. With a general utility function, 
even this statement is no longer true. However, this problem has not been very relevant in the development 
of demand theory. 
12
  Edgeworth’s misleading argument is pointed out by Dominedò 1937: 227, 286-8. 
13
  Regarding the methodological reason why Marshall rejected Edgeworth’s suggestion of a general utility 
function, see Dardi 1991: 96-101. 
14
  Regarding the use of the additive utility assumption among leading neoclassical economist at the end of the 
19th century, see also Stigler 1950: 326-7. 
15
  On the relationship between Pareto’s expression of  i i p x ∂ ∂  and those later obtained by Slutsky and Hicks–
Allen, see Schultz 1935, Chipman 1976, Dooley 1983 and Weber 1999b. 
16
  As is well known, “ophelimity” is the Paretian term for utility. 
17
  The analytical expression of  I xi ∂ ∂  is not present in Pareto’s works. In fact, in accordance with Walras’ 
approach, in Pareto’s general theory of exchange, income is not regarded as a distinct exogenous variable, 
but is endogenously given as the value of the agent’s endowment at market prices. More on this in Weber 
1999b. 
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18
  Johnson does not cite Pareto. On the relationship between Johnson and Pareto see Moscati 2005. 
19
  Slutsky refers admiringly to Pareto but does not cite Johnson. 
20
  Slutsky’s compensated variation of price is a change in consumer income accompanying a change in price 
which makes the consumer’s initial consumption bundle just affordable at new prices. 
21
  Actually, Slutsky does not demonstrate this result, which will be first proved by Samuelson 1938: 69. On 
the importance of the negative semi-definiteness of the substitution matrix see below, section 3.7. 
22
  For the 1930s, see Allen 1934, Hicks–Allen 1934, Lange 1934, Georgescu-Roegen 1936, Samuelson 1938 
and Hicks 1939: 18-9. 
23
  Let us consider  () ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n x x x u f  with  0 '> f  and denote  i i x u u ∂ ∂ =  and  j i ij x x u u ∂ ∂ ∂ =
2 . Even if  0 < ii u , 
the second-order derivative  () ()
2 2 2 ' ' ' i ii i u f u f x x u f + = ∂ ∂  could be positive if 
2 ' ' i u f  is large “enough”. 
24
  According to the Auspitz–Lieben–Edgeworth–Pareto notion, two goods i and j are complementary if 
0 > ij u , and substitute if  0 < ij u . However the sign of  () () j i ij j i u u f u f x x x u f ' ' '
2 + = ∂ ∂ ∂  can be different from 
that of  ij u . 
25
  On Pareto’s position concerning additive separability and cardinal measurability of utility see Chipman 
1971 and 1976. 
26
  On the ambiguities contained in Pareto’s work and the possible explications for them see Chipman 1976, 
Gross–Tarascio 1998, Ranchetti 1998, Bruni-Guala 2001, Weber 2001, Bruni 2002. 
27
  Bowley is evidently unaware of Slutsky’s paper. 
28
  For a detailed analysis of the rediscovery of Slutsky’s article see Chipman–Lenfant 2002. 
29
  More on the problems related to Schultz’s findings in Hands–Mirowski 1998. Hands and Mirowski pro-
pose a story of the American demand theory centered on Schultz’s statistical findings and on H. Hotel-
ling’s demand model (Hotelling 1932, 1935). Although Hands–Mirowski’s reconstruction is replete with 
interesting, new information, in my opinion it is untenable, as Hurwicz 1998 convincingly shows. 
30
  On Thurstone’s and other experiments in consumer theory between 1930 and 1970, see Moscati 2004. 
31
  P. Mongin (2000: 1135-9) persuasively demonstrates that, already in 1938 and not later, Samuelson was 
not interested in eliminating utility from microeconomic theory. 
32
  A reconstruction of the history of the integrability problem can be found in Hurwicz 1971. See also Chip-
man 1971 and 1982. 
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33
  To complete the picture of the relationships between the axioms of revealed preference and the properties 
of the substitution matrix, it must be added that R. Kihlstrom, A. Mas-Colell, and H. Sonnenshein (1976) 
show that the negative semi-definiteness of the substitution matrix is equivalent to a weakened version of 
the Weak Axiom, which they term Weak Weak Axiom. L. Hurwicz and M.K. Richter (1979) prove that the 
symmetry of Slutsky’s matrix is equivalent to a weakened version of the Strong Axiom, originally stated by 
J. Ville (1946). 
34
  Quasi-concave is a function  () x u  for which  () ( ) () { } z j i x u x u x u   ,   min ≥  for each  () z j i x x x λ λ − + = 1 , with 
[] 1   , 0 ∈ λ . Quasi-concavity is invariant to a monotonic transformation of  () x u . 
35
  For the axiomatic treatment of additive utility see among others Debreu 1960 and Luce–Tukey 1964. For 
the axiomatic treatment of cardinal utility, see among others Suppes–Winet 1955 and Chipman 1960. On 
these topics see Chipman 1971 and Ellingsten 1994. 
36
 See  e.g. Ward 1972, Blaug 1999, Hutchison 2000. 
37
  More on the difficulties of Lakatos’ approach in rationalizing the history of economics in Hands 1985. 
38
  For a detailed and supportive assessment of these trends see Hands 2001. This draft: April 27, 2005 
  36 
References 
Allen, R.G.D. (1934). A Comparison Between Different Definitions of Complementary and Com-
petitive Goods. Econometrica, 2: 168-75. 
— (1936). Professor Slutsky’s Theory of Consumers’ Choice. Review of Economic Studies, 3: 120-
9. 
— (1938). Mathematical Analysis for Economists. London: Macmillan. 
Amoroso, L. (1921). Lezioni di economia matematica. Bologna: Zanichelli. 
— (1928). Discussione del sistema di equazioni che definiscono l’equilibrio del consumatore. An-
nali di economia, 4: 31-41. 
Antonelli, G.B. (1886). Sulla teoria matematica dell’economia politica. Pisa: Tipografia del Fol-
chetto. 
Arrow, K.J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. 
— (1959). Rational Choice Functions and Orderings. Economica [N.S.], 26: 121-27. 
Aupetit, A. (1901). Essai sur la théorie générale de la monnaie. Paris: Guillaumin. 
Auspitz, R. and Lieben R. (1889). Untersuchungen über die Theorie des Preises. Leipzig: Duncker 
und Humblot. 
Barone, E. (1894). A proposito delle indagini del Fisher. Giornale degli Economisti [2], 9: 413-39. 
Barrotta, P. (1996). A Neo-Kantian Critique of von Mises’s Epistemology. Economics and Phi-
losophy, 22: 51-66. 
Blaug, M. (1992). The Methodology of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— (1999). The Formalist Revolution or What happened to Orthodox Economics after World War 
II? In R.E. Backhouse and J. Creedy (eds) From Classical Economics to the Theory of the Firm, 
Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 257-80. 
Boninsegni, P. (1904). Tentativi di ricerca sulle funzioni di domanda e di offerta nel caso del barat-
to, supposte le ofelimità elementari lineari. Giornale degli Economisti [2], 29: 210-36. 
— (1925). Traité d’économie politique. Économie politique théorique, premier cahier. Lausanne: 
Rouge. 
Bordin, A. (1932). Lezioni di economia politica: la statica (Parte I). Padova: Cedam. 
Borgatta, G. (1911-12a). Di una proprietà generale dell’ofelimità. Atti della Reale Accademia delle 
Scienze di Torino, 47: 422-45. 
— (1911-12b). L’ofelimità delle quantità iniziali e l’equilibrio economico. Atti della Reale Acca-
demia delle Scienze di Torino, 47: 545-58. 
Bowley, A.L. (1924). The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Bruni, L. (2002). Vilfredo Pareto and the Birth of Modern Microeconomics. Cheltenham: Elgar. 
Bruni, L. and Guala, F. (2001). Vilfredo Pareto and the Epistemological Foundations of Choice 
Theory. History of Political Economy, 33: 21-49. 
Cassel, G. (1899). Grundriss einer elementaren Preislehre. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissen-
schaft, 55: 395-458. 
Cassirer, E. (1953) [1910]. Substance and Function. London-Chicago: Dover. 
Clark, J.B. (1899). The Distribution of Wealth. London-New York: Macmillan. 
Chipman, J.S. (1960). The Foundations of Utility. Econometrica, 9: 193-224. 
— (1971). Introduction to Part II. In Chipman, J.S. et al. (eds) (1971), pp. 321-31. 
— (1976). The Paretian Heritage. Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 14: 65-173. 
— (1982). Samuelson and Consumption Theory. In G.R. Feiwel (ed) Samuelson and Neoclassical 
Economics, Boston: Kluwer, pp. 31-71. 
Chipman, J.S. and Lenfant, J.-S. (2002). Slutsky’s 1915 Article: How It Came to be Found and In-
terpreted. History of Political Economy, 34: 553-97. 
Chipman, J.S. et al. (eds) (1971). Preference, Utility and Demand. New York: Harcourt Brace Jo-
vanovich. 
Cohen, H. (1984) [1883]. Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte. Hilde-
sheim: Olms. This draft: April 27, 2005 
  37 
Colson, C. (1901). Cours d’economie politique. Vol. 1: Theorie generale des phenomenes econo-
miques. Paris: Gauthier-Villars et Alcan. 
Cournot, A. (1838). Recherches sur les Principes Mathématique de la Théorie des Richesses. Paris: 
Hachette. 
Cunynghame, H. (1904). A Geometrical Political Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Dardi, M. (1991). The Concept and the Role of the Individual in Marshallian Economics. Quaderni 
di Storia dell’Economia Politica, 9: 89-114. 
Debreu, G. (1954). Representation of a Preference Ordering by a Numerical Function. In R.M. 
Thrall et al. (eds) Decision Processes. New York: Wiley, pp. 159-65. 
— (1959). Theory of Value. New York: Wiley. 
— (1960). Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory. In K.J. Arrow et al. (eds) Mathemati-
cal Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 16-26.  
— (1983) [1977]. The Axiomatization of Economic Theory. Excerpts in Mathematical Economics: 
Twenty papers of Gerard Debreu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5-6. 
Divisia, F. (1928). Economique Rationelle. Paris: Dion. 
Dominedò, V. (1933). Considerazioni intorno alla teoria della domanda. Giornale degli Economisti 
e Rivista di Statistica, [4], 73: 30-48, 765-807. 
— (1937). Comments to the Italian edition of Edgeworth’s Mathematical Physhics. In G. Del Vec-
chio (ed.), Economia Pura. Torino: Utet, pp. 191-327. 
Dooley, P.C. (1983). Slutsky’s Equations Is Pareto’s Solution. History of Political Economy, 15: 
513-7. 
Duhem, P. (1906). La thèorie physique. Paris: Chevalier et Rivière. 
Dupuit, J. (1844). De la mesure de l’utilité des travaux publics. Annales des Ponts et Chaussées [2], 
8: 332-75. 
Edgeworth, F.Y. (1881). Mathematical Physhics. London: Kegan Paul. 
— (1897). La teoria pura del monopolio. Giornale degli Economisti [2], 15: 13-31, 307-20, 405-14. 
Ekelund, R.B. and Furubotn, E.G. and Gramm, W.P. (eds) (1972). The Evolution of Modern De-
mand Theory. Lexington: Lexington Books. 
Ellingsten, T. (1994). Cardinal Utility: A History of Hedonimetry. In M. Allais and O. Hagen (eds) 
Cardinaliusm, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 105-49. 
Evans, G.C. (1930). Mathematical Introduction to Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Fanno, M. (1925-26). Contributo alla teoria economica dei beni succedanei. Annali di economia, 2: 
329-468. 
Ferrari, M. (1997). Introduzione a il Neocriticismo. Roma-Bari: Laterza. 
Fisher, I. (1926) [1892]. Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices. New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press. 
Flux, A.W. 1904. Economic Principles. London: Methnen & Co. 
Friedman, Michael (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
— (2000). A Parting of Ways. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court. 
— (2001). Dynamics of Reason. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
— (2004). Ernst Cassirer. In E.N. Zalta (ed) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 
Edition). URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/cassirer/>. 
— (2005). Ernst Cassirer and the Philosophy of Science. In G. Gutting (ed) Continental Philosophy 
of Science, Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Friedman, Milton (1953). The Methodology of Positive Economics. In Essays in Positive Econom-
ics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-43. 
Frisch, R. (1926). Sur un problème d’economie pure. Norsk Matematisk Forenings Skrifter [1], 16: 
1-40. 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1936). The Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 50: 545-93. 
— (1954). Choice, Expectations, and Measurability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 68: 503-34. This draft: April 27, 2005 
  38 
Giocoli, N. (2003). Modeling Rational Agents, Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Gossen, H.H. (1854). Entwickelung der Gesetze des Menschlichen Verkehrs. Braunschweig: F. 
Vieweg und Sohn. 
Gross, M. and Tarascio, V.J. (1998). Pareto’s Theory of Choice. History of Political Economy, 30: 
171-87. 
Hands, D.W. (1985). Second Thoughts on Lakatos. History of Political Economy, 17: 1-16. 
— (2001). Reflection without Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hands, D.W. and Mirowski, P. (1998). Harold Hotelling and the Neoclassical Dream. In R. Back-
house et al. (eds) Economics and Methodology, London-New York: Macmillan, pp. 322-97. 
Hicks, J.R. (1937). Théorie mathématique de la valeur. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 
— (1939). Value and Capital. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Hicks, J.R. and Allen, R.G.D. (1934). A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value. Economica 
[N.S.], 1: 52-76, 196-219. 
Hotelling, H. (1932). Edgeworth’s Taxation Paradox and the Nature of Demand and Supply Func-
tions. Journal of Political Economy, 40: 577-616. 
— (1935). Demand Functions with Limited Budgets. Econometrica, 3: 66-78. 
Houthakker, H.S. (1950). Revealed Preference and Utility Function. Economica [N.S.], 17: 159-74. 
— (1961). The Present State of Consumption Theory. A Survey Article. Econometrica, 29: 704-40. 
Hurwicz, L. (1971). On the Problem of Integrability of Demand Functions. In Chipman, J.S. et al. 
(eds) (1971), pp. 174-214. 
— (1998). Comment. In R. Backhouse et al. (eds) Economics and Methodology, London-New 
York: Macmillan, pp. 399-421. 
Hurwicz, L. and Uzawa, H. (1971). On the Integrability of Demand Functions. In Chipman, J.S. et 
al. (eds) (1971), pp. 114-48. 
Hurwicz, L. and Richter, M.K. (1979). Ville Axioms and Consumer Theory. Econometrica, 47: 
603-19. 
Hutchison, T. (2000). On the Methodology of Economics and the Formalist Revolution. Chelten-
ham: Elgar. 
Jevons, W.S. (1871). The Theory of Political Economy. London-New York: Macmillan. 
Johnson, W.E. (1913). The Pure Theory of Utility Curves. Economic Journal, 23: 483-513. 
Kihlstrom, R., Mas-Colell A. and Sonnenschein H. (1976). The Demand Theory of the Weak 
Axiom of Revealed Preference. Econometrica, 44: 971-78. 
Knight, F.H. (1944). Realism and Relevance in the Theory of Demand. Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, 52: 289-318. 
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Phi-
losophical Papers, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, pp. 8-101. 
— (1971). History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions. In Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University press, pp. 102-38. 
Lange, O. (1934). The Determinateness of the Utility Function. Review of Economic Studies, 1: 
218-25. 
Lester, R.A. (1946). Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis for Wage-Employment Problems, Ameri-
can Economic Review, 36: 63-82. 
Luce, R.D. and Tukey, J.W. (1964). Simultaneous Conjoint Measurement: A New Type of Funda-
mental Measurement, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1: 1-27. 
Machlup, F. (1946). Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research. American Economic Review, 36: 
519-54. 
— (1955). The problem of Verification in Economics. Southern Economic Journal, 22:1-21. 
— (1964). Professor Samuelson on Theory and Realism. American Economic Review, 54: 733-35. 
Mäki, U. (1989). On the Problem of Realism in Economics, Ricerche Economiche, 43: 176-198. 
Marschak, J. (1950). Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility. Economet-
rica, 18: 111-41. 
Marshall, A. (1961). Principles of Economics. Ninth (Variorum) Edition. London: Macmillan. This draft: April 27, 2005 
  39 
Menger, C. (1871). Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre. Wien: Braumüller. 
Mirowski, P. (1989). More Heat than Light. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— (2002). Machine Dreams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mirowski, P. and Hands, D.W. (1998). A Paradox of Budgets. In M.S. Morgan and M. Rutherford 
(eds) From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 
260-92. 
Mises, L. von. (1949). Human Action. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mongin, P. (2000). Les préférences révelées et la formation de la théorie du consommateur. Revue 
économique, 51: 1125-52. 
Montesano, A. (1996). Introduzione. In G. Sabattini (ed) Abraham Wald e il programma di ricerca 
sull’equilibrio, Milano: Angeli, pp. 11-31. 
— (2004). Umberto Ricci, l’utilità marginale e la teoria della domanda. In P. Bini (ed.) Umberto 
Ricci. 1879-1946. Firenze: Polistampa, pp. 99-116. 
Mornati, F. (1999). Pasquale Boninsegni e la Scuola di Losanna. Torino: Utet. 
Moscati, I. (2004). Early Experiments in Consumer Demand Theory: 1930-1971. Università Boc-
coni, Working Paper TPE 2004-2. 
— (2005). W.E. Johnson’s 1913 Paper and The Question of His Knowledge of Pareto. Journal of 
the History of Economic Thought, forthcoming. 
Ollig, H.-L. (1998). Neo-Kantianism. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6: 776-92. 
Osorio, A. (1913). Théorie mathématique de l’échange. Paris: Giard et Briére. 
Pantaleoni, M. (1889). Principii di economia pura. Firenze: Barbera. 
— (1898). Pure Economics, London: Macmillan. 
Pareto, V. (1892-93). Considerazioni sui principii fondamentali dell’economia politica pura. Gior-
nale degli Economisti [2], 4: 389-420; 4: 485-512; 5: 119-57; 6: 1-37; 7: 279-321. 
— (1896-97). Cours d’économie politique. Lausanne: Rouge. 
— (1900). Sunto di alcuni capitoli di un nuovo trattato di economia pura del prof. Pareto. Giornale 
degli Economisti [2], 20: 216-35; 511-49. 
— (1906). Manuale di Economia Politica. Milano: Società Editrice Libraria. 
— (1909). Manuel d’économie politique. Paris: Giard et Brière. 
Parsons, S.D. (1990). The Philosophical Roots of Modern Austrian Economics: Past Problems and 
Future Prospects. History of Political Economy, 22: 295-319. 
— (1997). Mises, The A Priori, and the Foundations of Economics. Economics and Philosophy, 13: 
175-96. 
Pietri-Tonelli, A. de. (1927). Traité d’économie rationelle. Paris: Giard. 
Poincaré, H. (1902). La science et l’hypothèse. Paris: Flammarion. 
Ranchetti, F. (1998). Choice without Utility? In M. Bianchi (ed.) The Active Consumer. London: 
Routledge, pp. 21-45. 
Ricci, U. (1904). Curve crescenti di ofelimità elementare e di domanda. Giornale degli Economisti 
[2], 29: 112-38. 
Richter, M.K. (1971). Rational Choice. In Chipman, J.S. et al. (eds) (1971), pp. 29-58. 
Samuelson, P. (1938). A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour. Economica [N.S.], 5: 
61-71, 353-4. 
— (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. 
— (1950). The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory. Economica [N.S.], 17: 355-85. 
— (1953). Consumption Theorems in Terms of Over-Compensation Rather Than Indifference 
Comparisons. Economica [N.S.], 20: 1-9. 
— (1963). Problems of Methodology – Discussion. American Economic Review, Papers and Pro-
ceeding, 53: 231-36. 
— (1974). Complementary. Journal of Economic Literature, 12: 1255-89. 
Schultz, H. (1933). Interrelations of Demand. Journal of Political Economy, 41: 468-512. 
— (1935). Interrelations of Demand, Price, and Income. Journal of Political Economy, 43: 433-81. This draft: April 27, 2005 
  40 
— (1938). The Theory and Measurement of Demand. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Slutsky, E. (1915). Sulla teoria del bilancio del consumatore. Giornale degli Economisti [3], 51: 1-
26. 
Stigler, G.J. (1939). The Limitations of Statistical Demand Curves. Journal of the American Statis-
tical Association, 34: 469-81. 
— (1950). The Development of Utility Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 58: 307-27, 373-96. 
Suppes, P. and Winet, M. (1955). An Axiomatization of Utility Based on the Notion of Utility Dif-
ferences. Management Science, 1: 259-70. 
Thurstone, L.L. (1931). The Indifference Function. Journal of Social Psychology, 2: 139-67. 
Uzawa H. (1960). Preference and Rational Choice in the Theory of Consumption. In K.J. Arrow et 
al. (eds) Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, pp. 129-48. 
Ville, J. (1946). Sur les conditions d’existence d’une ophélimité totale et d’un indice du niveau des 
prix. Annales de l’Université de Lyon, 9, A(3): 32-39. 
von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press. 
Wallis, W.A. and Friedman, M. (1942). The Empirical Derivation of Indifference Functions. In O. 
Lange et al. (eds) Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, pp. 175-89. 
Walras, L. (1874). Éléments d’économie politique pure. Lausanne: Corbaz & C. 
Ward, B. (1972). What’s Wrong with Economics? New York: Macmillan. 
Weber, C.E. (1999a). Slutsky and Additive Utility Functions, 1947-1972. History of Political 
Economy, 31: 393-416. 
— (1999b). More on Slutsky’s Equation as Pareto Solution. History of Political Economy, 31: 575-
86. 
— (2001). Pareto and the 53 Percent Ordinal Theory of Utility. History of Political Economy, 33: 
541-76. 
Weinberger, O. (1930). Mathematische Wirtschaftslehre. Leipzig: Teubner. 
Wicksell, K. (1893). Über Wert, Kapital und Rente. Jena: Fisher. 
Wicksteed P.H. (1888). The Alphabet of Economic Science. London: Macmillan. 
— (1910). The Common Sense of Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 
Wieser, F.F. von. (1889). Über die Ursprung und die Hauptgesetzte des wirtschaftslichen Werthes. 
Wien: Hölder. 
Wold, H. (1943-44). A Synthesis of Pure Demand Analysis. Skandinavisk Aktuarietidskrift, I: 26: 
85-118; II: 26: 220-63; III: 27: 69-120. 
Zawadzky, W. (1914). Les mathématiques appliquées à l’économie politique. Paris: Rivière. 